Paper
The Evolutionary Game Analysis on Water Pollution Control Strategy of Basin Local Governments—A Case of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project
- Authors:
- Yufei Qu
- Abstract
- Water Pollution Problem of water supply areas of South-to-North Water Transfer Project is attracting increasing attention. The local governments of Water supply areas along the water delivery line will face two strategies choice: Pollution control or No pollution control. The paper puts the local governments of water supply areas as the basic research object, uses the evolutionary game (EG) theory, and separately analyses repeated dynamic and its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the local governments’ strategies choice with and without Superior government supervising. This study suggests that the ESS will be (No pollution control, No pollution control) when the Superior government have no supervision. And on the contrary, the ESS will be changed according to the varying degrees of Incentives or Punitive measures carried out by the Superior government. The Superior government must bring effective incentive and punitive measures into force to the local governments and guide the ESS to stable state which is good for the operation of SNWT project.
- Keywords
- the South-to-North Water Transfer Project (SNWT); Water Pollution; Evolutionary Game; ESS
- StartPage
- 35
- EndPage
- 39
- Doi