Paper

Optimal Investment Timing of Pollution Treatment Technology of Manufacturers: Analysis on 0ption-Game Theory


Authors:
Wang zhihui; Yi Yongxi
Abstract
In this article we establish a pollution treatment technology investment option gambling model in the situation of tradable emissions permits and technical uncertainty, and focus on the analysis of the impact of manufacturer own research ability and competitor's research ability to investing marginal value. The result indicates that the enhancement of manufacturer’s research ability may reduce the investment marginal value. When the research ability disparity of two firms is quite big, the possibility of sequential balance is also big; When their research ability disparity is not obvious, it will appear forestalls balance or balance of investing at the same time. The model simulation calculation proves that model reasoning process and the result is correct. The research has important reference value to the manufacturer who wants to formulate pollution government technology investment decision.
Keywords
Tradable Emissions Permits; Option Gambling; Technical Uncertainty
StartPage
75
EndPage
82
Doi
Download | Back to Issue| Archive