Volume 2 Issue 2
Authors: Samarjit Kar; Animesh Debnath; Jayanta Kumar Dey
Abstract: This paper presents the analysis of the effect of three motivational factors–voluntary duty, bureaucracy and consumers’ participation on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in a multi-period supply chain network (SCN). Following the Cruz’s (2009) analysis on SCN system, the optimal output level and the CSR activities in two-tier model consisting of manufacturer, retailer and consumer with motivation or incentive, might regularize the ‘production-CSR activity’ operation. This paper provides an extension of Cruz’s (2009) model in SCN to compute the equilibrium pattern of product outputs, transactions, prices and level of CSR activities in a multi-period time frame. The result shows that the different range level (negative or positive) of CSR activity has an effect on bureaucratic performance and willingness in different time periods.
Keywords: Bureaucratic Performance; Indirect Consumers’ participation in CSR; Willingness; Incentives; Inelasticity; SCN-brain
Authors: Silvio Vismara; Katrin Migliorati; Michele Meoli; Stefano Paleari
Abstract: This paper questions whether the segmentation in the European IPO market plays a role in determining the cost of going public. Precisely, we compare the commissions charged by underwriters to firms listing on the stock markets of the four largest European economies. Coherently with previous results, we document the existence of a non-linear relationship between the cost-variables and the amount of capital raised, with a different effect depending on the item cost considered. We find that the market structure affects the level of underwriter commissions, together with the prestige of the underwriter. We also investigate whether underwriters who charge high spreads are also able to leave more money on the table. Results are robust for endogeneity between underwriter commission and underpricing.
Keywords: IPOs; Going Public Decision; Underwriting Fees; European Stock Markets; Segmentation
Authors: Saeed Karimi Petanlar; Somaye Sadeghi
Abstract: This Paper investigates the causality and the long-run relationships between government expenditure and government revenue in oil exporting countries during 2000-2009 by using P-VAR framework. Since the major share of total revenue in these countries is related to the oil revenue, hence the oil revenue is applied as proxy of total revenue. The findings reveal that there is a positive unidirectional long-run relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures, as it is expected. What’s more, the findings show that one percent increase in oil revenue induces the increase of government expenditure to 1.16 percent. In other words, the “revenue-and-spend” hypothesis is confirmed in oil exporting countries.
Keywords: Government Expenditure; Government Revenue; Oil Exporting Countries; P-VAR
Authors: Tobias Weirowski; Martin Klein
Abstract: This paper investigates the link between unemployment and external trade in Germany, using data on unemployment, international trade and economic activity for the 16 German federal states (L&#228;nder). With panel data econometrics we show that international trade as measured by state-by-state trade shares has a significantly negative impact on state-by-state un-employment rates. We investigate to what extent this reflects mercantilist tendencies embedded in the political economy of the Federal Republic but we find no clear evidence in favor of simple mercantilism. We suggest three alternative explanations, which are linked to the structural rigidities of the German labor market, government involvement in the education and training system and certain labor market policies which provide government-subsidized unemployment insurance benefitting (mainly) export industries.
Keywords: JEL; F14; F15; O50; International Trade; Unemployment; Panel Study
Authors: Masamichi Kawano; Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Abstract: This paper considers a three-stage quantity-setting duopoly model with complementary goods. First, the first-mover firm decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. Second, the second-mover firm decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. Third, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. The paper demonstrates that there exist two opposite equilibria, and that at each equilibrium capacity investment is beneficial for both the firms.
Keywords: Quantity-setting Model; Complementary Goods; Capacity Investment